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Stander: Business Litigation 2016, Is There Room for Civil RICO?

BUSINESS LITIGATION 2016, IS THERE ROOM FOR CIVIL

RICO?
David J. Stander, Esq.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of the civil
private RICO action.' In fact, the Court has consistently stated that victims of racketeering
activity are to be turned into "private attorney generals." 2 The Supreme Court, as noted
above, in particular has emphasized the broad application and extraordinary purposes the
RICO statute has meant to serve.
So, how feasible is it for plaintiffs' attorneys to act as "private attorney generals" so
that they cannot effectively do their job like prosecutors? The answer is-- with great
difficulty, as only competent and experienced counsel can successfully tread through the
many requirements necessary to bring a successful civil RICO action. Moreover, because a
civil RICO action requires proof of serious criminal behavior, and it carries a stigma,4 the
courts are particularly reluctant to allow civil RICO actions to proceed. 5 The impediments to
plaintiffs' attorneys successfully serving as 'private attorney generals,' as envisioned by the
framers of the statute, and the Supreme Court, are described below.

* David J. Stander is a former Trial Attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice's Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section. Mr. Stander's practice focuses on the litigation of complex civil RICO fraud cases. Mr.

Stander has also published articles addressing civil RICO issues in West's Civil RICO Report and the ABA's
Business Torts and Civil RICO news. Mr. Stander is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Maryland,

a graduate of the University of Maryland School of Law, and is licensed in both Maryland and the District of
Columbia.
' See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (holding that the RICO statute is to be liberally
construed).

Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000); see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &Assocs. Inc.,
483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987).
2

[I]n rejecting a significantly different focus under RICO, therefore, we are honoring an
analogy that Congress itself accepted and relied upon, and one that promotes the

objectives of civil RICO as readily as it furthers the objects of the Clayton Act. Both
statutes share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation to
supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited
practices. The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn
them into prosecutors, 'private attorneysgeneral," dedicated to eliminating racketeering

activity. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added).
Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) ("The statute does not specifically define the outer
boundaries of the 'enterprise' . . "); Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 497 ("RICO is to be read broadly"); Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 479 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("RICO essentially seeks to prevent organized criminals from taking over or operating legitimate businesses. Its

language, however, extends its scope well beyond those central purposes."); Sedima S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 500
("The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of

the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern."').
4 "Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation equivalent of a "thermonuclear device," and

"stigmatizing." Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991); DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v.
Kontogiannis, 726 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
5 See discussion and cases below.
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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The following are the principal, but not the only, bases on which civil RICO cases
are dismissed. These issues are further discussed in this article.
A. Failure to Meet Rule 8(a) Plausibility Standard
In the wake of Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp. and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,6 courts
demand, even before there is any discovery, that the RICO claims be pleaded with "facial
plausibility," which allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for what is
alleged.' This is certainly a tall order given the complexity of a potential case and the fact
that many victims do not have the financial resources to invest significant amounts of monies
to diligently investigate every potential claim.' Compare the typical private plaintiff to the
U.S Department of Justice ("DOJ"), which utilizes professional investigators (FBI) and
highly trained and seasoned prosecutors to litigate their criminal RICO and governmental
civil RICO cases (e.g., the civil RICO against the tobacco companies). 9
B. Failure to File a "Short and Plain" Statement as Required by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)
Rule 8(a) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief."'o The typical civil RICO case is a complex fraud case with not only
RICO claims, but typically, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and common law fraud
claims." Unlike the criminal RICO indictments, which are sometimes over hundreds of
pages long, courts sometimes order plaintiffs to reduce the length of the complex civil
complaints so that the claim is "short and plain."' 2 This makes the plaintiffs' attorneys job
even more difficult in explaining the circumstances of the alleged violation so that is appears
'plausible' to the court.
Moreover, the criminal RICO indictment, upon which is are usually no word or
page limitation, is subject to a lesser standard at the pleading stage, i.e., the indictment must
only plead the elements of the offense. " Courts have rejected routinely civil RICO
complaints when they have only recited the elements of the offense without more.14

Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 718 (N. D. Ill. 2014) (stating "...the costs inherent in
major litigation can be crippling, and a plaintiff, lacking the resources to sustain a long fight, may be forced to
abandon the case or settle on distinctly disadvantageous terms.").
9 Id. at 718.
'o Fed. R. Civ. P. §8(a).
" FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 381 (3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter "MANUAL
6

FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION").
12

Fed. R. Civ. P. §8(a).

OF
JUSTICE,
U.
S.
ATTORNEYS'
CRIMINAL
RESOURCE
http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-222-elements-offense.
" MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note I1, at 381-391.
" DEP'T

MANUAL,

§

222,
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C. Failure to Meet the Particularity Provision of Federal Rule 9(b)
The most common plaintiff failure (because the typical civil RICO alleges fraud) is
to plead the circumstances of the fraud with particularity under Federal Rules of Civil Rule
§9(b).1 5 Cases analyzing Rule 9(b) are discussed at length below.

D. Failure to Plead a Pattern ("Garden-Variety" Fraud)
Courts also dismiss civil RICO cases based on fraud finding that a pattern of
racketeering activity (PORA) has not been alleged when the court views the claim as merely a
'garden-variety' fraud claim ("single-scheme, discreet goal").6 This is despite the Supreme
Court's express finding that RICO does not require the pleading or proving of 'multiple
schemes" to have a pattern of racketeering. " Thus, as described below, many of the lower
courts have found there is insufficient evidence of continuity of the racketeering activity to
support a finding of a "pattern of racketeering,"" while, on the other hand, there are lower
courts (both circuit and district) which do not ascribe to this strict view of PORA.'9

E. Incorrect Application of Civil RICO Conspiracy Provision
Courts still, amazingly, reflexively dismiss civil RICO conspiracy claims when they
have found the section 1962(c) 2 0 substantive provisions not adequately pleaded. 2 1 These

" Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be
alleged generally." Id.
16 See, e.g., Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1266 (l1" Cir. 2004) (citing to Efron v.
Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d at 18) (noting that "the fact that a defendant has been involved in only
one scheme with a singular objective and a closed group of targeted victims" supports the conclusion that there
is no continuity); Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265 (D.C.Cir. 1995)
(noting that predicate acts occurring over a three-year period are insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering
when the complaint alleged a single scheme with a single goal); see also Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant
Servs., 20 F.3d 771, 780 (7th Cir.1994) (stating that various factors besides temporal span should be considered
in assessing continuity, including the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes, and the occurrence
of distinct injuries); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1543 (10th Cir.1993) (explaining that, in
addition to duration, weighing "extensiveness" of the RICO scheme, including number of victims, number and
variety of racketeering acts, whether the injuries caused were distinct, the complexity and size of the scheme,
and the nature or character of the enterprise or the unlawful activity); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 208 (3d
Cir.1992) ("We have eschewed the notion that continuity is solely a temporal concept, though duration remains
the most significant factor."); U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir.1990)
("[I]t is not irrelevant, in analyzing the continuity requirement, that there is only one scheme." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).).
'7 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240-241 (1989) (holding definitively that proof of
multiple schemes is not necessary to establish a RICO pattern of racketeering.).
' See cases in discussion below.
'9 See cases in discussion below.
20 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
21 See. e.g., D. Penguin Bros. Ltd., H.T.A. Equities, Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, NBUF Dev. Ltd., 587 Fed.Appx.
663, 669 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing to First Capital Asset Mgmt., v. Satinwood Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 182 (2d Cir.
2004)).
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Courts are not considering the Supreme Court's views in Salinas,2 2 and as described below
are in error.

II. DETAILED ANALYSIS
As listed above, many civil RICO cases are dismissed at the pleadings stage for
failure to (1) plead fraud with particularity 23 ; (2) a finding that the claims are merely "gardenvariety claims," and thus do not support closed-ended continuity and a finding of pattern of
25
24
Cases
racketeering2 4 ; and (3) the RICO conspiracy provision is inadequately applied.
analyzing these issues will be discussed below:

A. Fed. Rule 9(b)
The lower courts have been particularly receptive to dismissing civil RICO fraud
26
The circuit courts
cases for failure to comply with Rule 9(b)'s "particularity" standard.
have followed the literal language of Rule 9(b) and stated that a plaintiff may plead generally
the defendants' state of mind or intent to deceive or defraud, but must make "particularized
allegations [regarding] the factual circumstances of the fraud itself' when pleading mail or
27
wire fraud as a predicate act.
Many circuit courts require plaintiffs to identify specific examples of the fraud while
28

In Burgess v. Religious Technology
pleading the overall nature of the fraud generally.
College, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Georgia RICO claim and federal
civil RICO claim finding that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded their fraud claims
with specificity.29 The Court found that Rule 9(b) was not satisfied when the time period of
the alleged misrepresentations was not identified, and the specific fraudulent statements the
defendants made were not alleged, requiring:
(1) precisely what statements or omissions were made in which documents
or oral representations; (2) the time and place of each such statement and
the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not
making) them; (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which
they misled the plaintiff; and (4) what the defendant obtained as a
consequence of the fraud.30

22 See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
23

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

24 See supra note 16.
25

There are of course many other legal grounds for dismissing civil RICO claims, such as failure to prove an

enterprise; failure to prove the defendant conducted the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering activity; failure to allege direct injury and concrete losses. Another common ground of dismissal
is failure to allege distinctness between the RICO person and the enterprise. See Cruz v. FX DirectDealer,

LLC., 720 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2013); In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 727 F.3d 473, 483, 84 (6" Cir.
2013).
26 See, e.g., H&Q Properties, Inc. v. Doll, 793 F.3d 852, 857 (81, Cir. 2015).
27 See Odom v. Microsoft, 486 F.3d 541,
554 (2007).
28 See Burgess v. Religious Technology College, 600 Fed.Appx.
657 (11 h Cir. 2015).
29 Id. at 665.
30 Id. at 662 (citing to Findwhat InvestorGrp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (1Ith Cir. 2011)).

46

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol15/iss1/3

4

Stander: Business Litigation 2016, Is There Room for Civil RICO?

BUSINESS LITIGATION

2016,

IS THERE ROOM FOR CIVIL RICO?

The Burgess court noted that when there are "prolonged multi-act schemes," there is
a relaxed standardwhich permits a plaintiff to plead the overall nature of the fraud and then
to allege with particularity one or more illustrative instances of the fraud. 3' "Even under the
relaxed requirement, however, a plaintiff is still required to allege at least some particular
2
examples of fraudulent conduct to lay a foundation for the rest of the allegations of fraud."
Other circuits have also affirmed the dismissal of civil RICO actions based on
failure to comply with Rule 9(b)'s particularity standard. In H & Q Properties, Inc. v. Doll,
the court affirmed dismissal of civil RICO finding inadequate pleading of fraud. 3 In Eclectic
PropertiesEast LLC v. Marcus Millichap, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to
grant a motion to dismiss a RICO and RICO complaint finding that complaint was found to
not contain adequate factual allegations to plausibly infer that defendants specifically
intended to defraud, and therefore did not show a plausible entitlement to relief. 34
Circuits have found sufficient allegations of fraud when specific instances of fraud
are adequately alleged.

1.

District Courts

'

Numerous district courts have dismissed civil RICO cases for failure to plead
36
These decisions are 'facts and circumstances'
particularity as required by Rule 9(b).
determinations, and do not necessarily present splits of opinion rather than how strictly the
law is interpreted. A sampling of recent decisions is instructive as to the rationale for
dismissing these cases.
The Southern District Court of New York dismissed a civil RICO complaint finding
that the fraudulent intent and particularity requirements were lacking. 3 ' The court discussed
in detail the requirements to meet Rule 9(b), depending upon whether the mailings themselves
contain the fraudulent misrepresentations, as opposed to when the mailings are merely an
incident to the scheme.39
The District of Nebraska dismissed a civil RICO claim alleging bank fraud, mail
fraud, and wire fraud. 4 0 The court found that the complaint failed to comply with Rule 9(b)
as it provided insufficient notice to defendants of their individual roles in perpetrating the
alleged acts of fraud. 4

" Id. at 662-663.
32 Id. at 663. See also U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v . Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220,
229 (Is Cir. 2004)
(relaxing Rule 9(b) standards "because of the apparent difficulties in specifically pleading mail and wire fraud
as predicate acts").
" See H&Q Properties, Inc. v. Doll, 793 F.3d 852, 857 (8" Cir. 2015).
34 See Eclectic Properties East LLC v. Marcus Millichap, 751 F.3d 990, 999 ( 9 th Cir. 2014).
15 See, e.g., Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d at 661. The court in Bible reversed the district
court's decision dismissing the action finding that a borrower adequately alleged a civil RICO violation in
connection with fraudulent loan practices. Id.
36 See cases in discussion below.
n See cases in discussion below.
38 See Sanchez v. ASA College Inc., 2015 WL 3540836, at *13 (S.D.N.Y., June 5, 2015).
' Id. at I I.
40 See H&Q Properties, Inc. v. Doll, 2014 WL 2919139, at *10 (D. Neb., June 26, 2014).
' ' Id. at *4, *7
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A judge in the District of New Jersey granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on a civil RICO claim alleging fraud stating that at this stage of the litigation more
42
than allegations and arguments are required.
A judge in California found that the plaintiff's mere listing of such alleged crimes,
without supporting, particularized factual pleadings as required under Rule 9(b), is not
43
enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
A judge the S.D. Florida granted a motion to dismiss when the plaintiffs merely
alleged that a defendant -U.S. Bank- was lumped with other defendants in a vague and
conclusory statement." The Court found this allegation was wholly inadequate to assert a
cause of action for a RICO violation.4 5
2.

Decisions Upholding Pleadings Under Rule 9(b)

These recent decisions highlight that a well-pleaded civil RICO complaint, along
with good facts, can result in a successful pleading and survive Rule 9(b).
In Rothstein v. GMAC Mortgage LLC, the Southern District Court of New York
rejected the defendant's argument that the alleged RICO and RICO conspiracy claims
(Counts One and Two) based on mail fraud violations should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted (Rule 12(b)(6) motion).4 6 The plaintiffs satisfied
the standards of Rule 9 (b) for pleading with particularity, and adequately pleaded facts which
showed (1) the defendants had the requisite intent to defraud; and (2) the defendants
knowingly participated in the scheme as they had the motive for committing fraud and the
opportunity to do so. 47 This decision provides an excellent blueprintfor analyzing a RICO
claim consisting ofpredicateacts of mail and wirefraud.
In Seikaly & Stewart v. Fairley, the court found sufficient material
misrepresentations to support the claim at the pleading stage.48
In Llewellyn-Jones v. Metro Prop, the court upheld a RICO complaint based on
fraud predicates finding sufficient relatedness and continuity. 4 9 The predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud alleged there were based on false and fraudulent purchase agreements, loan
applications, verification of deposit, lease agreements, and statements of income; use of the
telephone to disseminate fraudulent information to financial institutions and the plaintiffs; and
the transfer of funds to the plaintiffs.50 The court found even if the allegations of continuing
misconduct are insufficient, the plaintiffs alleged a pattern of misconduct involving nearly a

See Franco v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2861428, at *22 (D.N.J., June 24, 2014).
See Mohebbi v. Khazan, 50 F.Supp. 3d 1234, 1255 (N.D. Cal., June 23, 2014) (citing to Cf. Andrews Farms
v. Calcot, Ltd., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1239, at 1255) (quoting Odom v Microsoft, 486 F.3d at 554).
4 See U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n. v. Capparelli, 2014 WL 2807648, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla., June 20, 2014).
45 Id. at *8.
46 See Rothstein v. GMAC Mortgage LLC, 2013 WL 5437648, at *16, *19 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2013), rev'd
on othergrounds, Rothstein v. Balboa Ins. Co., 794 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2015).
47 Id.at *13-15. See also Marrero-Rolon v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, P.R., 2015 WL 5719801 (D.P.R.,
Sept. 29, 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss on Rule 9(b) particularity grounds).
48 See Seikaly & Stewart v. Fairley, 18 F.Supp.3d 989, 996 (D. Ariz., May 14, 2014).
49 See Llewellyn-Jones v. Metro Prop, 22 F.Supp.3d 760, 793 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2014).
so Id. at 791-793.
42
43

48
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dozen properties over a long period of time, thus satisfying the closed-ended continuity
requirement, and finding the RICO count pleaded adequately. 5
In Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Services, the court denied the defendant's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a civil RICO claim brought by a New Jersey homeowner against
his mortgage loan servicer and several insurers, alleging a kickback scheme involving "forceplaced hazard insurance."5 2 The court noted that the alleged facts and legal arguments mirror
those in several other actions across the country, and some district courts have dismissed
53
similar actions for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Alkhatib v. New York Motor Group, LLC, the court denied in part defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs civil RICO claims finding particularity met under Rule 9(b)
when the Plaintiffs described in exhaustive detail a sophisticated scheme pursuant to which
the dealership defendants lure customers in with low advertised prices, use aggressive sales
tactics and false promises to induce customers to enter into onerous financing agreements,
and fraudulently conceal from customers that the documents presented to them contain
undisclosed charges. 5 4 Plaintiffs identified the particular individuals who made statements to
them, what statements they made, and why the statements were part of a fraudulent scheme.
In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, LLC, in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that when faced with a motion to dismiss for
failure to plead fraud 'with particularity' as required by Rule 9(b), "a court must factor in the
policy of simplicity in pleading which the drafters of the Federal Rules codified in Rule
8." 5 6The court concluded that "[w]hen read against the backdrop of Rule 8, it is clear that the
purpose of Rule 9 is not to reintroduce formalities to pleading, but is instead to provide
defendants with a more specific form of notice as to the particulars of their alleged
misconduct." 57 "So long as [the plaintiff] pleads sufficient detail-in terms of time, place and
content, the nature of a defendant's fraudulent scheme, and the injury resulting from the
fraud-to allow the defendant to prepare a responsive pleading, the requirements of Rule 9(b)
will generally be met." 5 8 The court continued to state that
in complex civil RICO actions involving multiple defendants, Rule 9(b)
does not require that the 'temporal or geographic particulars of each
mailing made in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme be stated with
particularity, but only that the plaintiff delineate, with adequate
particularity in the body of the complaint, the specific circumstances
59
constituting the overall fraudulent scheme.

51

Id. at 793.

See Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Services, 2015 WL 4162443, at *11-12 (D.N.J. July 8, 2015).
Id. at *0-ll.
54 See Alkhatib v. New York Motor Group, LLC, 2015 WL 3507340, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y June 3, 2015).
" Id. at*12.
56 See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, LLC, 2015 WL 3403359, at *10 (E.D. Mich.
May, 27, 2015).
57 Id. at *10 (quoting Coffey v. Foamex L.P., 2 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir.1993)).
58 Id. at *10 (quoting United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir.2008)).
' Id. at *11.
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In Sussenbach Family Ltd. Partnership v. Access Midstream Partners, L.P., the
court denied the defendant's motions to dismiss a RICO claim based on property mail and
wire fraud finding the predicate acts were not isolated events, but were related acts aimed at
the common purpose and goal of defrauding lessors to pay and incur the falsely inflated,
unauthorized charges with respect to oil and gas leases and thereby enable defendants to reap
illicit profits.6 o Defendants were common participants in the predicate acts and their activities
amounted to a common course of conduct, with similar pattern and purpose, intended to
deceive lessors.
B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity ("Garden-Variety Fraud")
1.

Circuit Courts

It must be stated at the onset that a successful pleading of "open-ended" continuity
will usually obviate the closed-ended "ordinary business dispute" defense argument.6 This
is because in an open-ended scheme, by its very nature, there must be a "threat of continuing
criminal activity," which limits the open-ended analysis to usually those factual situations
63
involving serious crimes, not mere single-issue business disputes.
In Kalitta Air, LLC. V. GSBD Associates, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower
court's dismissal of a civil RICO complaint for failure to state a claim finding that the
plaintiff (Kalitta Air) had adequately alleged a pattern of racketeering under the "open-ended"
The court found there was a threat of continuing criminal
or "threat of continuity" prong.6
activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed by "showing that
the predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business."65
The amended complaint pleaded factual allegations of the same predicate acts being used on
another victim (Arrow Air) of a very similar scheme;66 and the participant defendants were
still operational and because of its "regular way of doing business" the defendants remained a
threat to others and could have even continued to keep the scheme going against the
plaintiff. 67 Thus, when there are allegations beyond those asserting a mere contract dispute, a
scheme which involved multiple victims, and did not involve a single scheme with a finite
end-point, an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity can be found.

See Sussenbach Family Ltd. Partnership v. Access Midstream Partners, L.P., 2015 WL 1470863, *9 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 31, 2015).

6

61 Id.
62

Kalitta Air, LLC v. GSBD Associates, 591 Fed.Appx. 338, 342 (6" Cir. 2014).

63 Id.

"

Id. at 347.

65

Id. at 342 (citing to H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989)).

66
67

Id. at 346-347

68

Id., at 345-346.
Kalitta Air, LLC, 591 Fed.Appx. at 347.
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a.

RICO?

Closed-Ended Continuity

As discussed in the cases below, there is a split in the circuits developing involving
this issue.69 Many circuits have stated that where the RICO allegations concern only a single
scheme with a discretegoal, a closed-ended pattern of racketeering has not been alleged even
when the scheme took place over a longer period of time.7 o Courts have also stated that "the
fact that a defendant has been involved in only one scheme with a singular objective and a
closed group of targeted victims" supports the conclusion that there is no continuity.71 The
Second Circuit also follows this view. 72
Now, to the issue of the developing split. In Tabas v. Tabas, contradicted in part by
the Third Circuit's view in Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Invements, the Third Circuit
explicitly recognized the liberal construction of civil RICO, consistent with the holding in
Sedima74 , despite its severe penalties, to "garden variety" fraud cases.7 However, the Ninth
6
Circuit in Kearny, takes issue with the majority of the circuits.
2.

Strict View of First Circuit

The First Circuit continues the hard-line against finding a PORA based upon a
77
closed-ended continuity analysis even when the activities occurred over a period of years.
In Home Orthopaedics Corp., v. Rodriguez, the court dismissed a civil RICO complaint
finding the Complaint inadequately alleged a pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., by failing to
adequately allege either closed-ended or open-ended continuity when the action evolved from
a business transaction which only harmed one party, even though multiple instances of
extortionate threats were made over a period of years, and the defendant sought to destroy the
Plaintiffs' business when Plaintiff refused to pay the Defendant.78
The court found that
Home Orthopaedics failed to adequately allege that defendants Ra6l, Linares, and Pino
engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity," as all of their actionable racketeering acts
"relate[d] to a single transaction"-the signing of a 2005 Letter of Agreement-"aimed to
extort" Home Orthopaedics.

'9 See cases below.
70 See Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1267 (1 s Cir. 2004).
1
71 See Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 18 (IS Cir. 2000). See also Edmondson & Gallagher

v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding predicate acts occurring over
three year period insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering when complaint alleged a single scheme with a

single goal) (emphasis added); U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 911 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7'" Cir. 1990)
("[I]t is not irrelevant, in analyzing the continuity requirement, that there is only one scheme.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
72

See Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 488-489 (2d Cir. 2014) ("RICO claims

premised on mail or wire fraud must be particularly scrutinized because of the relative ease with which a
plaintiff may mold a RICO pattern from allegations that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support it."). (citing to

Efron, 223 F.3d 12, at 20).
7 See Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Investments, 361 Fed.Appx. 354, 363(3rd Cir. 2010).
' See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
7 See Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1296-1297 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc).
76 See Kearny v. Foley & Lardner, 607 Fed.Appx. 757, 759 ( 9 " Cir. 2015).
n See Home Orthopaedics Corp., v. Rodriguez, 781 F.3d 521, 530-531 (1" Cir. 2015).
7 See id. at 530-531.
79 Id. at 531.
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The Court explained that this case fell in the "squishy" area, as the making of
multiple threats to a plaintiff over a period of years, stemmed from a single contract breach.80
The court thus looked to other "indicia of continuity;"' for instance, whether the defendants
were involved in multiple schemes, as opposed to "one scheme with a singular objective" 82 ;
whether the scheme affected many people, or only a "closed group of targeted victims" 8 3 ; and
84
whether the scheme had the potential to last indefinitely, instead of having a "finite nature."
In not finding closed-ended or open-ended continuity, the court stated that even if the
defendants committed numerous crimes to try to collect this specific sum of money, all of
these unlawful acts "have their origin in," a single event" or a "single "transaction." 8 5 The
court also found that the Complaint also failed under 'open-ended' continuity because there
was no showing that the "scheme" to collect money would continue into the indefinite future,
nor had Home Orthopedics attempted to show that the defendants' alleged racketeering acts
were part of their regular way of doing business.8 6
Thus, this decision reflects the reluctance of courts to get involved in single business
dispute, even when there is extortionate activity, a serious racketeeringpredicateoffense.

3. Ninth Circuit Is More Favorable to Plaintiffs
In contrast to the First Circuit's view, the Ninth Circuit has looked more favorably
finding a pattern based on closed-ended continuity, even involving fraud, when there is only a
"single-scheme, discrete goal."
In Kearny v. Foley & Lardner, the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court erred in dismissing Kearney's RICO claim for insufficiently alleging a
pattern of racketeering activity. The court allegations involved a series of relatedfraudulent
predicate acts that began in April 2000 and ended, at the earliest, in November 2002.89 The
court found that more than two years amounted to a substantial period of time to satisfy the
closed-ended continuity requirement.90
Because Kearney alleged that the predicate acts amounted to a substantial period of
time, she was not required to allege that the acts posed a threat of continued criminal
activity. 9' Additionally, Kearney was not required to show multiple schemes and multiple
victims to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity. 9 2 The court stated that a "pattern"
does not require multiple schemes "so long as the predicate acts involved are not isolated or

so Id. at 529.
81 Id.
82

Home Orthopaedics Corp., 781 F.3d 521.

83 Id.

Id. (citing to Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1" Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 530 (quoting Efron, 223 F.3d at 19, "[o]ur own precedent firmly rejects RICO liability where the
alleged racketeering acts ... , taken together, ... comprise a single effort to facilitate a single financial
endeavor.").
86 Id. at 531.
87 Kearny v. Foley & Lardner, 607 Fed.Appx. 757, 758 (9" Cir. 2015).
8

85

8

Id. at 759.

89 Id.
9

Id. at 758.

92 Id. at 759.
92 id.
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sporadic."9 The acts there were not isolated or sporadic; they occurred consistently, without
break, for two years.9 4 Thus, the takeaway here is that skilled counsel is necessary to
effectively argue the "pattern" requirement in a civil RICO case, given the wide range of
views by the circuits.
4.

District Courts- Closed Ended Continuity

Many district courts have dismissed civil RICO claims based upon fraud predicates
and situations involving "single schemes with a discrete goal," but others have not.95 Those
cases dismissing civil RICO claims include Yesko v. Fell, 96 where the court, in dismissing a
RICO complaint, reiterated the narrow stance of the Fourth Circuit, expressed in Flip
Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, specifically stating that "[T]his circuit will not lightly permit
ordinary business contract or fraud disputes to be transformed into federal RICO claims." 97
In Mineo v. McEachern, the court refused to allow the entry of a default judgment finding the
plaintiff did not adequately plead the RICO "sub-element" of continuity when the plaintiff
was allegedly defrauded on one occasion by an attorney as part of a complex fraud scheme."'
Moreover, judges dismiss civil RICO claims arising out of contracts finding the
plaintiff must sufficiently plead fraudulent acts independent of the breach of contract. 99
District courts have continued in recent cases to take the "hard-line" on what they
perceive as "ordinary business disputes" and thus rule against plaintiffs finding that a PORA
has not been adequately alleged.' 00 In Lu v. Lezell, the court stated that although relatedness
and continuity have become the sine qua non of a RICO case, the D.C. Circuit "continues to
endorse a case-by-case, fact-specific approach" that is "fluid, flexible, and commonsensical,
rather than rigid or formulaic."'' This approach to the pattern requirement "helps to prevent
ordinary business disputes from becoming viable RICO claims."1 02 The court stated that if
courts were to recognize a RICO claim based on simple business fraud, "the pattern
requirement would be rendered meaningless."10 3 The court in Lu stated that Congress was
concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.""'0 As a result, "if a plaintiff alleges

" Kearny v. Foley & Lardner, 607 Fed.Appx. 757, 759 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Sun Say. And Loan Ass'n v.

Dierforff, 825 F.2d 187, 191-94 (9" Cir. 1987)).

d

94

9 See cases below.
96 See Yesko v. Fell, 2014 WL 4406849 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2014).
1 See Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988).
9 See generally Dewitt Insurance, Inc. v. Horton, 2014 WL 2208073 (E.D. Mo. May 28, 2014).
99 See Sivak v. United Parcel Service Company, 2014 WL 2938088, at *725 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2014)
(granting a motion to dismiss a civil RICO claim when the alleged "fraudulent activity" was derived solely
from an interpretation of a shipping contract); see also Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Investments, 361

Fed.Appx. 354, 363-364, 366 (3" Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a civil RICO claim for failure to state a
claim when the plaintiff brought an action alleging mail and wire fraud predicates which was based upon
breach of contract).
'* See Lu v. Lezell, 45 F.Supp.3d 86, 97 (D.D.C. 2014).
on Id.
102

Id.

3 Id.
"'0

Id. at 98.
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only a single scheme, a single injury, and few victims it is 'virtually impossible for plaintiffs
05
to state a RICO claim.",
In Ixotic AG v. Kammer, the Eastern District of New York has continued the hardline against closed-ended continuity when the court viewed the legal dispute as "an ordinary
business dispute" or "garden-variety fraud" even when the racketeering activity occurred over
34 months.1 06 In Ixotic, the court adopted the findings of the magistrate judge who dismissed,
Plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants
with prejudice, the civil RICO complaint. 'o
conducted a scheme by using a set of corporate identities that were either shells or did not
exist at all, websites with plagiarized content, and corporate names and domain names that
were confusingly similar to those of legitimate business entities to defraud the plaintiffs of
many millions of dollars.'os The plaintiffs further alleged how each of the parties may have
known each other, where the various wire communications originated, and errors in the
various agreements that should have alerted them to the alleged fraud.'
Despite this particularity, the district court judge agreed with the magistrate that the
plaintiffs failed to plead any viable RICO claim because they had not adequately alleged a
pattern of racketeering activity. "o The Ixotic court considered only the time during which the
defendants committed the predicate acts alleged to calculate the relevant time period."' The
court further stated a period of racketeering activity lasting less than two years does not
suffice to establish closed-ended continuity, and even if the predicate acts span two years,
such is insufficient, without more, to support a finding of a closed-ended pattern." "[O]ther
factors such as the number and variety of predicate acts, the number of both participants and
victims, and the presence of separate schemes are relevant in determining whether closedended continuity exists.""12
Thus, the Ixotic court found that even though the period in which the plaintiffs
alleged racketeering activity spanned 34 months, and thus exceeded the two years that has
generally been considered the minimum needed to establish closed-ended continuity, the
court found that continuity did not suffice because of other factors that weighed against such a
finding; i.e., the plaintiffs alleged only a single type of racketeering activity (wire fraud)
targeting a single group of three victims (all of whom are essentially one for purposes of how
the fraudulent scheme was allegedly executed) with a single goal of defrauding them of
money in connection with a single matter.' 3

105 Id. (citing Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 684 (4th Cir.1989) (declining to extend RICO

liability where defendants' actions were "narrowly directed towards a single fraudulent goal" and "involved a
limited purpose").
5o6 See Ixotic AG v. Kammer, 2015 WL 270028, at *1l (E.D.N.Y Jan. 21, 2015).

'so Id. at 1.
1os Id. at 7.
10

Id.

"io Id. at 10

." Id. at I1; see e.g., Coquina Investments v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, (1l 1h Cir. 2014).
112 Ixotic AG v. Kammer, 2015 WL 270028, at * It (E.D.N.Y Jan. 21, 2015).
"3 Id. at II (citing Ho Myung Moolson Co., Ltd. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 239, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Courts have repeatedly held that a simple fraud scheme is insufficient to state a RICO
violation."); see also PrevMED Inc. v. MNM-1997, Inc., 2015 WL 4162729 (N.D. Tex., July 10, 2015)
("[C]ontinuity cannot be established by multiple acts of fraud that are part of a single transaction.").
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Other district courts have rejected the finding of closed-ended continuity, even when
the predicate activity lasted for a long period of time.11 4 In Puerto Rico Clean Energy Corp.,
v. Hatton-Gotry, the court found that twelve predicate acts over nine years did not
The court stated that other
automatically compel a finding of closed-ended continuity.
indicia of continuity may include whether the controversy involves multiple schemes (or just
one scheme with a single objective), whether the scheme impacts many victims (or only a
closed, targeted group of people), and whether the scheme has the potential to last indefinitely
(or is instead of a finite nature). 15
Despite the above, there are some district courts, however, which are finding that
plaintiffs are adequately alleging closed-ended continuity, even when the facts are merely a
"single-scheme, discrete goal." 116 A recent district court case, also arising in the Il1th Circuit
refutes the notion that continuity may not be found even when there is a "single-scheme,
These cases remain in the minority however, and practitioners are
discrete goal."" 7
cautioned to try to find facts to support "open-ended continuity" when pleading their RICO
complaint. "8

C. CIVIL RICO CONSPIRACY PROVISION
The third issue being explored here is whether courts are in errorwhen they dismiss
RICO conspiracy claims based solely upon a finding that a substantive violation of RICO was
not adequately pleaded."' These decisions are wrongly decided. Courts must begin to take
into account Salinas, and the circuits which have followed Salinas before reflexively
dismissing RICO conspiracy section 1962(d) claims. 20
Two recent examples of circuit courts, wrongfully, dismissing section 1962(d)
claims on the rationale that the section 1962(c) claims were not sufficiently pleaded come
from the Second Circuitl 2 1 and the Fifth Circuit. 1 22 In D. Penguin Bros., Inc., the Second
Circuit held that "the failure to state a claim for a substantive RICO violation, moreover, is

"4 See cases discussed below.
"' See Peurto Rico Clean Energy Corp. v. Hatton-Gotay, 2015 WL 4481548, at *4 (D.P.R. July 23, 2015)

(citing to Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguez, 781 F.3d 521, 529 (I" Cir. 2015)).
..
6 See Lawrence Holdings, Inc. v. ASA Intern.; Ltd, 2014 WL 5502464 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2014) (broadly
construing civil RICO fraud claims, citing to Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985)).
" See Chesapeake Employer's Insurance Co., v. Eades et al., 77 F. Supp.3d 1241, 1255 (2015).
"" See Alkhatib v. New York Motor Group, LLC, 2015 WL 3507340, at *20-21 (E.D.N.Y June 3, 2015) (not
finding closed-ended continuity, but finding open-ended continuity when enterprise dealerships continued to
operate their businesses).
'" See, e.g., GT Roofing Co., Inc. LLC v. Killion, 2015 WL 4255466, at *120 (E.D. Mo., July 13, 2015)
(citing to Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506-07 (2000)) (stating that in order to state a claim of RICO
conspiracy under § 1962(d), a plaintiff must have sustained injury by "an overt act" that is "an act of
racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO."). This injury requirement is the only additional element
which must be pleaded and proved in a civil RICO conspiracy claim as opposed to a criminal RICO conspiracy
claim. See 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c).
120 See discussion that Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), applies in a civil RICO case in State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. CPT Medical Services, P.C., 375 F.Supp.2d 141, 150-151 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
12i See D. Penguin Bros. Ltd., v. City National Bank, 587 Fed.Appx. 663, 669 (2d Cir. 2014).
122 See North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co., Ltd. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 201-204 (5"h Cir.
2015).
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fatal to plaintiffs' RICO conspiracy claim under § 1962(d)."1 2 3 The court in D. Penquin Bros.
curiously cited to Beck v. Prupis in which the Supreme Court stated that it had not resolved
"whether an actionable violation under section 1962(c) is necessary to allege a section
1962(d) claim, or rather whether it is sufficient for there to be a mere agreement to complete a
substantive violation and the commission of one racketeering act which causes injury." 2 4
Beck rightfully recognizes the civil RICO conspiracy injury requirement, a
requirement not necessary in criminal RICO.125 The Court in Beck specifically did not
resolve the issue of whether a section 1962(d) claim must be predicated upon an actionable
violation of section 1962(a)-(c). 126 The Supreme Court was much clearer three years earlier
in Salinas, stating that it is not required to allege or prove the actual completion of a single
racketeering act by the defendant or any other member of the conspiracy because completion
of an overt act is not an element of the offense.127 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Salinas
specifically held that there is no requirement that the defendant "himself committed or agreed
28
to commit the two predicate acts requisite for a substantive offense under section 1962(c)."l
The Court in Salinas further stated that "[a] conspirator must intend to further an endeavor
which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it
suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor." 129
As a result of Salinas, four circuits, including the Second Circuit, have held in
criminal RICO cases, that the government is not required to allege or prove the actual
completion of a single racketeering act by the defendant or any other member of the
conspiracy.1 3 0 The most recent case expressly following the dictates of Salinas has been U.S.
v. Cornell, which, in agreement with the other circuits which have addressed the issue,
concluded that the district court's instruction requiring unanimity as to the types of
racketeering acts that members of the conspiracy agreed to commit was sufficient, and no
instruction as to the commission of specific acts was required.
Therefore, I posit that the proper test in civil RICO conspiracy claims is Salinas,
plus Beck. Here, one circuit has specifically applied Salinas, to a civil RICO conspiracy
claim, i.e., Smith v. Berg, where the court specifically held that "Salinas makes 'clear that
section 1962(c) liability is not a prerequisite to section 1962(d) liability."'" 3 2 Recent district
court decisions reiterate this principle. 1
But, the other circuit cases following Salinas are all criminal RICO actions. Thus,
adoption of Salinas to civil RICO conspiracy must be modified by the Beck holding in which
(1) an agreement to complete a substantive violation; and (2) the commission of at least one

123

D. Penguin Bros. Ltd., 587 Fed.Appx. at 669 (citing to First Capital Asset Management Inc. v. Satinwood,

385 F.3d 159, 182 (2d Cir. 2004).
124 Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S.
at 506.
125 Id. at 119.
126 Id.
127 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61-66 (1997).
121 Id. at 61.
129 Id. at 65, emphasis
added.
30 See cases discussed below.
131 See U.S. v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 625 (4h Cir., 2015) (petitionforcert.
docketed).
32 See Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 537-538
(3 d Cir. 2001).
33 See also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. CPT Medical Services,
P.C., 375 F.Supp.2d 141, 150-151
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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act of racketeering [by a conspirator] which caused the plaintiff injury is required.1 3 4 But,
consistent with Salinas, the Beck court held a plaintiff could sue co-conspirators under section
1964(c) for a violation of section 1962(d) who might not themselves violated one of the
substantive provisions of section 1962.'3
Therefore, I would contend that courts are in error in automatically finding a RICO
conspiracy claim fatal when there has been a failure to adequately state a claim for a RICO
substantive violation. To sustain a civil RICO conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must be able to
plausibly allege that the defendant agreed to facilitate a scheme in which conspirators who
are operators or managers would commit at least two acts in the furtherance of the affairs of
the enterprise. 36 Failure to properly allege this agreement, plus the commission by a
conspirator of at least one racketeering act which directly caused the plaintiff injury, is the
only basis upon which a district court may correctly dismiss a civil RICO conspiracy claim.

D. CONCLUSION
Because there is no private right of action for criminal breaches like extortion, mail
fraud and wire fraud, the civil RICO statute is sometimes the only way to present a large-scale
fraud scheme involving many victims in federal court, absent persuading an overburdened
DOJ into conducting a criminal investigation. The stringent conditions placed on plaintiffs'
attorneys by the lower courts obviously compromise the role of plaintiffs as the "private
attorneys generals" as envisioned by Congress and the Supreme Court.

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506-07, n. 10 (2000) (emphasis added).
* Id. at 506-507.
136 See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (91h Cir. 2004); Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 538 ( 3
Cir. 2001).

'
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